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Chapter Four
Between Segregation and Gentrification: Africans,
Indians, and the struggle for housing in Dar es
Salaam, 1920-1950
James R. Brennan
This chapter investigates two interconnected relationships. The first
relationship is between two competing principles of  colonial urban policy,
segregation and gentrification. Keeping with German precedent, the British
colonial government segregated Dar es Salaam into three zones, corresponding
with neighbourhood economic activity, housing standards and—implicitly but
quite plainly—racial groups. At the same time, however, the colonial
government also championed urban improvement through securing conditions
for greater capital investment, a policy which this chapter terms
‘gentrification’.1  These two policies came into conflict along the spatial border
where Africans and Indians met. Relations between Indians and Africans in
Dar es Salaam form the second relationship at the heart of  the chapter.2  This
relationship imbued colonial urban policies with political meaning. A policy of
segregation eventually yielded to one of gentrification as Dar es Salaam’s
Indian community outgrew its narrow commercial ‘zone’ and expanded into
African-designated areas such as Kariakoo. Lacking the financial resources
and political will to maintain the ‘racial integrity’ of African neighbourhoods,
the British colonial government abandoned spatial controls of racial zoning
for economic controls of managing urban living costs. In a most peculiar
legacy, the discarded urban policy of  segregation provided a language of
political empowerment and invective for Africans fearing that Indian-led forces
of gentrification would dispossess poorer households in established African
neighbourhoods.
Dar es Salaam’s urban policy was grounded on the racial legal codes of the
colonial state. From the ashes of  German policy, British officials rebuilt a legal
structure grounded on distinctions between Europeans, Indians, and Africans
in order to restructure spatial and economic interaction among these groups
after formally taking control over Tanganyika in 1919. Nominally intended to
protect the interest of African ‘natives’, the administration of these laws
revealed two competing colonial visions for urban Africa—one that
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contemplated state-guided urbanization driven by non-African commerce
and capital improvements, and another that contemplated the systematic
protection of Africans from non-African market forces. This division
manifested itself in the pursuit of competing priorities among British officials,
some of whom sought to raise public health standards by encouraging non-
African expansion, while others sought to protect African-held urban and
peri-urban areas by championing segregationist and protectionist policies. Of
at least equal importance, African and South Asian initiatives in many cases
ran far ahead of either administrative vision, and there emerged a distinctly
reactive and ad hoc character to inter-war urban administration.
The British administration’s land, credit, and trade policies ideally bifurcated
Tanganyika’s population between African ‘native’ producers living largely on
communal lands, and European and Asian ‘non-natives’ confined either to
urban areas or estates alienated during German rule. In 1920 the new
administration formed a Central Building and Town Planning Committee to
oversee Dar es Salaam’s reconstruction, and this committee adopted almost
all German precedents.3  Seeking to secure a separate European residential
area yet finding legal racial segregation ‘impracticable’ as well as in conflict
with the government’s trusteeship mandate from the League of Nations, the
committee dropped explicitly racial references and retained ‘a standard to
which all new buildings must conform’, which ‘will secure the “same
advantages”’ as de jure segregation.4  The close proximity of the residential
(i.e., European) Zone I and commercial (i.e., Asian) Zone II, however, divided
only by a single street along which expensive buildings already stood, imposed
formidable costs to executing segregationist public health prerogatives, and
obviated plans to create a second ‘neutral zone’ to complement the first such
zone, between Zone II and the ‘native’ Zone III, created in the late German
period. ‘Segregation for Europeans and Asiatics in Dar-es-Salaam, and probably
also in Tanga, appears to be impracticable’, the Land Officer concluded in
1920. ‘There does not appear to be anything, however’, he continued, ‘to
prevent segregation of other races from natives’.5
Building and sanitation codes provided the first of two major tools officials
utilized to segregate Dar es Salaam.6  Structural improvements to already-
standing ‘native’ houses in Zones I and II were forbidden in 1920.7  Beginning
in 1923, the government offered Africans new plots in Zone III (the ‘native’
zone) in exchange for quitting their plots in the European and Indian quarters.
Many accepted but were slow to move, and in 1928 the government ordered
them to demolish their old houses within six months.8  The cornerstone of the
new administration’s segregationist urban planning in Dar es Salaam was the
renewal and re-clearance of the old German sanitary corridor or neutral
zone.9  The majority of Africans evicted were relocated to Ilala, a new
residential quarter in Zone III laid out in 1930; ‘non-native’ evictees were left
to their own devices.10  The neutral zone itself (Mnazi Mmoja today) was
reserved for non-European sporting purposes. Urban land policy was the
second major tool used to restructure and segregate post-war Dar es Salaam.
German titles had granted either leasehold tenure or restricted ownership, a
tenure similar to freehold.11  Plots with stone buildings were given renewable
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government leases usually lasting thirty years, while plots of makuti huts were
given annual tenancy renewable year to year.12  This annual renewable tenancy
was known colloquially as kiwanja tenure, named after the kiwanja (Swahili,
‘plot’) tax that the German administration had charged urban residents in
addition to an annual house or hut tax. During the 1920s, the new British
administration lacked sufficient records and deeds, and thus payment of kiwanja
tax implied recognition of  tenancy. In order to raise revenue collections and
building standards in ‘non-native’ areas, however, the new government
proposed to replace kiwanja tenure with a Rights of Occupancy tenure system.13
Rights of Occupancy tenancies required that structures on leased plots conform
to the Township Authority’s grid layout and be worth an agreed-upon value. In
Zone II, these tenancies usually called for two-storied, permanent stone
structures with water-borne waste disposal. Colonial officials considered South
Asians the worst sanitary offenders in town, and hoped that conversion to a
Rights of Occupancy system would raise sanitary conditions.14  In 1926, the
government launched a lengthy and contested battle against ‘non-native’ tenants,
most residing in Zone II, to replace kiwanja tenure with Rights of Occupancy for
terms of 33, 50, or 99 years, with land rents determined by public auction.
The imposition of a more coercive land tenure system contingent on capital
investment resulted in the state-guided gentrification of Dar es Salaam’s Indian
neighborhood. The Provincial Commissioner reported that the introduction
of more secure land tenure in 1927 had given ‘a fillip to the building trade in
the town’.15  Indian speculators cheaply acquired several desirable plots with
dilapidated buildings in anticipation of their rising value.16  The most valuable
sites were obtained by bidding competitions.17  In one typical contract, Ghulam
Haidar acquired a plot for 33 years at Shs. 200/- annual rent if he constructed
a building worth Shs. 4,000/- within two years.18  Average annual plot rentals
increased from Shs. 60/- under the year-to-year kiwanja tenure to Shs. 194/-
under the long-term Rights of Occupancy tenure.19  Enforcement of these
building covenants eventually produced a neighborhood predominated by
expensive stone buildings by the mid-1930s.
The gentrification of the Indian quarter undermined the segregation of
the African quarter, popularly known as ‘Kariakoo’. Several Indians in Zone
II could not afford the substantial improvements brought about by Rights of
Occupancy leases, and renters faced impossibly high rents. A District Officer
observed in 1929 that, despite the on-going building boom, rents still remained
‘at a fictitiously high figure’, while housing conditions for most Indians ‘can
only be classed as scandalous and worse than the slum areas of European
cities’.20  South Asians seeking cheaper plots and rents moved to Kariakoo. E.
C. Baker noted that Indians could ‘obtain greater privacy and more attractive
surroundings at a lower debt’ in the African quarter than in Zone II.21  Between
1931 and 1939, the number of ‘native’-owned houses in zone III rented by
Indians rose from 32 to between 200 and 300.22  The influx of Indians into
the African quarter revealed the limits of segregationist zoning laws, and
confronted officials with an enduring contradiction—how to manage
interactions between ‘native’ Africans and ‘non-native’ South Asians in the
theoretically exclusive ‘native’ zone of Kariakoo.
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Kariakoo and competing visions of
urban development, 1920-1940
Major segregationist public works such as the clearing of the ‘neutral zone’
and Kisutu village were exceptional for their unambiguous consequences –
Africans were simply removed from non-native or ‘neutral’ areas. Far more
important to the social history of  Dar es Salaam, however, were the
contradictory results that segregationist laws produced when they intruded
upon inevitable interactions between Africans and Indians. These interactions
challenged the intent and viability of housing, trade, and land laws. More
importantly, the interaction between Indians and Africans, and the enduring
African urban presence, forced officials to confront the implications of the
colonial vision that inherently communal ‘natives’ needed protection from
the predations of the inherently individualistic ‘non-natives’.
The establishment of the central market in Kariakoo in the early 1920s
stimulated the development of Dar es Salaam’s most vital neighborhood. In
stunning contradiction to the logic of racial-cum-occupational zones that
guided Dar es Salaam’s urban planning, the administration not only relocated
the city’s central market from the Indian to the African quarter, but also
established a ‘non-native’ trading area surrounding the new market. The old
market in the ‘Asiatic’ quarter was too small and could not meet growing
demand for stalls. In the eyes of medical director R. R. Scott, the market
premises were ‘disgraceful and insanitary blots on our otherwise fairly
presentable town’ whose congestion drove small traders onto the streets to
hawk foodstuffs in unsanitary conditions.23  The market was moved in August
1923 to the eponymous Carrier Corps building (in Kiswahili, ‘Kariakoo’), built
originally by the Germans in 1914 as a market to stimulate the area’s
development, but immediately converted into a depot for German and later
British military porters during the war.24  The British resuscitated German
plans by surveying over 600 plots in the native zone along a grid plan with the
new market as its focal point, dramatically raising property values in its
proximity.25  In the wake of  the new market’s opening, Indians emigrated in
large number to Kariakoo to seize trading opportunities. In early 1931, Indians
legally owned 142 of the 2,035 houses in Zone III on Rights of Occupancy
tenure, most located around the market or along Msimbazi and Kichwele
(today Uhuru) Streets; a further thirty-two African-owned houses were rented
by ‘non-natives’, mostly South Asians. As a group, ‘non-natives’ occupied
over 9 percent of  the houses in the African quarter.26  E. C. Baker observed at
this time that ‘[i]t is hard to foresee the future of Zone III the population of
which is becoming very mixed’.27
Kariakoo grew amidst contradictory expectations between many Indians
and Township Authority officials on the one hand who hoped that the
neighborhood would become a commercial area with a strong ‘non-native’
presence, and many Africans and District Office officials on the other hand
who hoped that it would be an exclusively African residential neighborhood.
The former view was anchored by the swift domination of Indian traders
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over Kariakoo’s commercial life during the 1920s. By 1927, ‘non-natives’,
nearly all of whom were Indians, occupied 396 of the 420 trading sites in
Zone III.28  The protectionist land tenure system that forbade ‘non-natives’
from acquiring ‘native’ property was thus regularly circumvented in Dar es
Salaam over the inter-war period by building in the exempted ‘non-native’
trading zone within Kariakoo. Beyond the central market, Indian acquisition
of African-owned housing required the Governor’s approval. Over the early
and mid-1920s, the protectionist-segregationist view had few effective
advocates, as very few Indian requests for the Governor’s approval to obtain
‘native’ property in Kariakoo were denied or even contested. As a result, the
major economic development of Kariakoo during the inter-war period was
the dramatic increase of property and rental values created largely by the
influx of Indians willing and able to pay considerably higher purchase prices
and rents from African house-owners.
Opponents of the Indian incursion into Kariakoo discovered that
segregationist urban planning laws offered little in the way of positive
protection for African interests. One of the administration’s chief instruments
to effect urban segregation was building codes, which were the legal basis in
defining Dar es Salaam’s ‘non-native’ European and Asian zones. The relevant
clause in the township rules stated only that the ‘native’ Zone III should be
reserved as ‘an area for native quarters only’, without specifying zonal building
regulations. The Township Authority’s planning committee, no longer able to
square this ideal with the reality of a multi-racial Kariakoo, moved in 1932 to
substitute this clause with ‘an area in which buildings of a type to be approved
by the competent township authority may be erected’, on grounds that ‘[t]his
practice of allowing non-Native businesses to become established in Zone III
is one of  long standing and, though contrary to law, it has the advantage of
providing convenient shopping facilities for the Native residents’.29  A District
Office official stated his reservations to the committee’s suggestion:
However, as land becomes more valuable that native may get gradually
squeezed out of the area which has, for practical purposes, been allocated
for his use. It seems to me that in the natives interest we should import the
racial question to some extent and say that Zone III is confined to native
quarters and such other premises, approved by the Township Authority, as
that Authority considers necessary to serve the needs of the residents in
the Zone.30
A Township Authority official agreed that rising land values were pushing
poorer African inhabitants from Kariakoo, but countered that ‘nothing we
can do will enable people with Whitechapel incomes to live in Mayfair . . . [i]t
may be unfortunate, but it is inevitable’.
31
 Imposing maximum building
standards, he warned, would be a mistake of  the first order, as better buildings
benefit everyone, Africans included. The Chief Secretary agreed with the
Township Authority’s planning committee that the clause ‘an area for native
quarters only’ should be altered, and added that the new description should
be phrased to permit any type of quarters in Zone III. He justified this decision
by arguing, rather disingenuously, that ‘it has not been the intention of  the
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government to prevent Natives from building elsewhere than in Zone III, or
that persons other than Natives should not build in that zone if they have the
land and wish to do so’.
32
 Government revised the building ordinance for
Zone III the following year to allow for the construction of any type of
building instead of  ‘native’ types only, retroactively legalizing ‘non-native’
building types in the area.
33
 The administration proved unwilling to sacrifice
either the improved building standards or substantial land rents and license
fees generated by Indians in Kariakoo.
Township Authority officials – whom the government had allocated the
task of general urban improvement – approved of South Asian penetration
into the ‘native’ quarter because their capital investments raised tax revenue
and building standards. In response to Indian commercial predominance in
Kariakoo, the Township Authority re-zoned Zone III along its main
thoroughfare, Msimbazi Street in 1925. It declared the area east of Msimbazi
a commercial zone, and the area west of Msimbazi (despite already having
several shops) a residential area, effectively shifting the division between the
Indian commercial zone and African residential zone from the ‘neutral zone’
to Msimbazi Street.34  The commercial successes of Dar es Salaam’s burgeoning
South Asian population made possible this extension of the commercial to
residential, east to west, higher-status to lower-status, lighter to darker pattern
of zoning that in practice valued the principle of gentrification over segregation.
In a half-hearted attempt to reconstruct a protected ‘native’ zone further west
of  Kariakoo but still within Zone III, the Township Authority declared plots
around the new market in Ilala reserved for ‘natives’ in 1932, but also agreed
that Kariakoo already had too many shops and too few residential plots. Africans
were thereafter regularly refused trading permits west of Msimbazi in
Kariakoo.35
District Office officials—whom the administration had allocated the task
of protecting urban ‘native’ interests—were unwilling to leave Kariakoo and
its largely African population to the whims of Indian-dominated market forces.
In 1929, Dar es Salaam’s District Officer appealed to the Land Officer that:
You are doubtless perceiving the fact that native owned land in the township
of Dar-es-Salaam is rapidly passing into the possession of non-natives
who are mostly of  Asian nationality. This general process is causing me
some uneasiness. The growth of land monopoly of such a character is not
good and I submit to you that it is wrong to regard it as a natural course of
events.36
Despairing to prevent Indians from further entering Kariakoo, District Office
officials retreated their expectations westwards in hopes of maintaining Ilala
as an exclusively ‘native’ area. In 1934, however, this policy was unexpectedly
changed after a Land Officer refused an application by an Arab (considered
‘non-native’) to buy a house from an African in Ilala, on the understanding
that everything west of Msimbazi Street was reserved for natives. The Chief
Secretary over-ruled him on grounds that it was ‘never the intention of the
government to establish a racial standard in this or in any similar area, nor to
prevent a native from selling his plot to a non-native, when he could
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 Upon later discovering through the courts that
township notices establishing separate residential and trading areas within
Zone III were ultra vires (beyond legal authority), the administration in 1937
declared the whole of Zone III a trading area. One effect of these constant
policy shifts was, unsurprisingly, administrative confusion. Though now
Africans could legally trade in their own houses in Zone III if a proper license
was obtained and the buildings met township standards, this information
appears to have been either ignored or not effectively communicated, for
officials continued to deny Africans permission to trade from their own
residences.
38
 Itinerant commerce, meanwhile, lay mostly in the hands of
African traders, many of whom were supplied by Indian shopkeepers taking
up buildings in Kariakoo—reflecting the complicated and intertwined nature
of relations between Indians and Africans, as well as the futility of regulating
economic and residential behaviour through zoning legislation that attempted
to segregate the Indian and the commercial on the one hand from the African
and the residential on the other.
Sacrificed in the struggle between rival official visions of Kariakoo as a
‘native residential’ or ‘non-native commercial’ area were the fortunes of Dar
es Salaam’s embryonic African commercial class. The re-zoning of Kariakoo
into residential and commercial areas had been nominally intended to protect
Africans from entering into agreements with non-natives that, many officials
believed, ended inevitably in Africans’ displacement from their residences.
Instead, this re-zoning prevented Africans from establishing shops in the most
convenient locations possible—their own premises. In the early 1920s, the
government offered plots in a ‘native’ trading area around an open square in
Kariakoo to Africans willing both to erect cement-floored buildings suitable
for a foodstuff  shop and to pay an economic rent of  Shs. 100/- per year, but
none were taken up.39  Although a number of Africans opened up small shops
in Zone III during the 1923 Indian commercial strike (hartal) with the
government’s encouragement40 , the number of African shopkeepers (as
distinct from market stall-holders and doorstep vendors) in Dar es Salaam had
decreased to only two by mid-1931.41  The town’s Executive Officer concluded
that Africans from this coastal region ‘have not the trading instinct sufficiently
developed to run the business of a shop in competition with non-natives
already established’.42  E. C. Baker explained that African traders did not take
up plots in the trading lay-out because of steep ‘economic’ rents—i.e., land
rents set in proportion to the anticipated value of permanent structures to be
built on the plots—and the proximity to Indians, ‘with whom he feels that he
is unable to enter into competition’.43  Government appears to have prohibited
native and non-native traders alike from establishing shops on the township’s
borders to avoid this proximity to fierce competition.44  African traders in
1923 had asked for legal concessions in this theoretically ‘native’ zone from
non-native sanitary laws that required produce retailers to have cemented
verandahs that discouraged vermin, something generally affordable to Indians
alone.45  These traders were initially exempted from building codes for trading
everything but green food and fish, but by the late 1920s, public health concerns
prevailed over what little official prerogative to cultivate an African commercial
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class had existed.46  Both native and non-native traders were routinely
prohibited from trading by medical authorities who found their premises
unsatisfactory, even though trading licenses had been taken out.47  By 1939
there were only twenty African shops in Zone III, all holding small values of
stock, and twelve of which were in the restricted area of Ilala.48
African landlords, Indian tenants
Geographic declarations were blunt and ineffective tools in shaping Kariakoo’s
development. Officials tended to rely more heavily, if  no more effectively, on
regulating interaction between individual natives and non-natives on a case-
by-case basis. Their chief legal mechanism was granting or denying permission
for either the transfer or sub-letting of plots in Zone III by ‘natives’ to ‘non-
natives’. The influx of Indians willing to pay high purchase prices and rents
went largely unchecked during the 1920s, but even Township Authority
officials began to reconsider the implications of this during the 1930s. The
most important figure was E. H. Helps, a South African who served as Municipal
Secretary of  Dar es Salaam’s Township Authority from 1929 until 1945.
Helps supported the general project of Indian-led gentrification, but feared
its excesses would leave urban Africans without a stable residential centre. He
warned in 1932 that ‘the constantly increasing number of traders in the Native
Area is depriving Natives of  their residential holdings in the Township’,49  and
later noted that:
Properties leased by natives to non-natives are almost invariably purchased
by the lessees at a later date. Non-natives are interested in all properties in
Zone III which are valuable for trading purposes but no others. I am
personally in favor of natives being given every encouragement to trade
among themselves in Zone III, possibly to the exclusion of non-natives
whose true locale for trading purpose is Zone II. My reason for this is that
natives are gradually surrendering all the best plots in Zone III to non-
natives. They cannot resist the temptation of a good offer for their premises,
but not infrequently the riches thus acquired become dissipated within a
short time.50
Case by case, District Office officials and Helps attempted to preserve the
African position in Zone III by enforcing regulations that increased the cost
of doing business with non-natives.51  Kariakoo housed a large class of African
house-owners whose main livelihood was their lodgers’ rent; Baker called the
house ‘the one form of investment of the urban native’.52  In 1931, these
house-owners could charge ‘non-natives’—almost invariably South Asians—
as much as Shs. 120/- per month for a whole house, while the average room
rent paid by an African was Shs. 5/- per month.53  By the late 1930s, the
government required Africans renting to non-natives to take out ‘non-native’
Rights of Occupancy at economic rents, rather than continuing to profit from
paying low annual fees of kiwanja tenure while receiving high rents from ‘non-
native’ tenants. Many such lease agreements between African landlords and
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Indian tenants, however, were entered into ‘without reference to and without
knowledge of the government’.54
House-owners had profited handsomely during the boom years of 1926 to
1930, but economic depression put the ‘floating population’ of lodgers on
which house-owners depended for their income, as well as many house-owners
themselves, out of work—one-third of adult African males in Dar es Salaam
were unemployed in 1931.55  Mama Nurdini, an African landlady, complained
that she did not rent to ‘Waswahili’ because they cannot pay even half  of  what
Indians could, they did not stay in one place for long, and they were often
repatriated from town by the government for not paying their poll taxes.56  E.
C. Baker similarly noted that ‘native rents are often one or two months in
arrears and the lodger not infrequently decamps at night in order to avoid
paying his debts’.57  In 1936, the Director of Medical Services demanded that
the government no longer brook Africans’ chronic failure to finish their houses,
and called for the vigorous enforcement of a long-standing law requiring that
all African houses be of ‘approved type’ and completed within twelve months.
‘The time has come’, Scott announced, ‘when a higher standard of construction
can fairly be insisted upon’.58  Better-off African landlords could most easily
meet these standards through the rents of Indian lodgers. African homeowners
positioned to profit from the Indian presence in Zone III seized those
opportunities and often circumvented paternalistic policies designed for their
protection in the process. Living costs, not landlessness, had long been the
principal concern of Africans in Dar es Salaam. By the late 1930s, it had
finally become the principal concern of British colonial officials as well.
Crises in food and housing and the origins
of popular racial politics, 1940-1950
Dar es Salaam expanded rapidly in the 1940s. Annual population growth rose
from roughly two percent to eight percent. Pressured by spiraling urbanization
that strained the provision of basic minimum living conditions, and work
stoppages that protested the unaffordability of urban life, the colonial
government began a thorough-going intervention into the urban economy,
abandoning its ad hoc system of urban growth management. The regulation of
living costs replaced segregationist town planning as the major feature of
Tanganyika’s urban policy. During the Second World War, food and piece-
good imports fell while urban immigration from upcountry increased,
intensifying the state’s desire to maintain minimum urban living conditions for
Africans while minimizing their presence. The result of subsequent state
intervention was to further politicize and racialize the distribution mechanisms
of  Dar es Salaam’s economy. 59
Racial inequities in the supply of urban housing and food formed the
foundation of  popular racial politics in Dar es Salaam. Food had been rationed
throughout the city from 1943 on a racial basis, causing enormous resentment
among Africans towards Indians’ higher ration standard.60  The end of the
war did little to alleviate conditions, as the immediate post-war years proved
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the most difficult in the town’s history for urban consumers – the Provincial
Commissioner declared that 1946 would be remembered as ‘one of the bleakest
in living memory’.61  Although wheat and butter rations had been discontinued
at the end of 1945, drought and locust attacks in 1946 forced the government
not only to re-introduce the rationing of these items, but also to reduce existing
maize and rice rations.62  Tensions between African consumers and Indian
merchants escalated, becoming ubiquitous during these crises. Tanganyika’s
intelligence officer reported that the steady rise in post-war living costs and
black marketing stood as ‘a definite and continued threat to Indo-African
relations’ because, while the government was ‘not unreasonably blamed for
this, the African’s primary reaction is anger against the Asians whom he
considers, with considerable justification, to be exploiting his essential needs’.63
Nowhere was this simmering racial resentment more clear than in public
debate over access to housing. The severe shortages and dramatic gentrification
of Dar es Salaam’s housing market intensified the racial meaning of urban
space while serving to mask class conflict between African landlords and
African renters. Home ownership and landlordism presented the most viable
business opportunity for the town’s African population, and subsequently
became site of  the sharpest intra-African class differentiation. Yet
consciousness of this class differentiation dissipated in the face of racial
resentment that emerged from the paradoxical ‘failure’ of urban segregation.
The most important development in Dar es Salaam’s housing market during
the 1940s was the increased influx of Indians into the theoretically ‘native’
Zone III area of Kariakoo and Ilala. African landlords often played a cagey
game, standing by quietly as African tenants protested this racial ‘takeover’ by
Indians, yet simultaneously exploiting burgeoning demand through raising
the rents of both remaining African and newly-arrived Indian tenants. The
result was a sharpened sense among Africans that they were entitled to certain
urban space by virtue of their shared racial identification.
A major part of the problem was the failure of housing construction to
keep pace with population growth. Building practically halted during the 1940s
because of a dire shortage of materials. While the number of African houses
had at best increased eleven percent, and perhaps even dropped during this
period, population grew from 33,000 to 45,000 between 1939 and 1943 –
raising the African area’s population density from ten to nearly fifteen people
per house.64  Moreover, Asians grossly overpopulated Zone II, where building
new homes and repairs to old ones had ceased since 1939 for want of cement
and iron, and many existing houses had been converted for military or
commercial purposes.65  By March 1945 the urban population had increased
to 55,000. The colonial government attempted to ameliorate the housing
crisis by erecting a sufficient amount of its own housing, but this came too
little and too late.66  The years 1946-48 were particularly severe owing to a
crisis in land availability and property speculation, which only eased in the
early 1950s.67  New housing construction was driven by property investors.
The well-entrenched class of African landlords – who wielded sufficient capital
to purchase 150 of the first 500 plots sold at the new neighborhood of
Magomeni, and by 1956 numbered 8,000, forming 19 percent of the town’s
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African population – were well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities offered
by this seller’s market.68
Indian ‘immigration’ into Kariakoo became a full-blown political crisis during
the 1940s. African residents had already witnessed over twenty years of official
racial zoning that on the one hand had resulted in the displacement of Africans
from Zones I and II, while on the other hand turned a blind eye to the
unauthorized erection of Indian-owned buildings in Zone III.69  Indians had
also purchased a number of ‘native’ properties in Zone III in the years
preceding the war, numbering 53 houses between 1936 and 1939, bringing
the total of Indian-owned properties there to 147.70  This rate of influx had
increased dramatically during the Second World War. Indian renters, either
bachelors or families, turned to African landlords as an affordable solution to
the spiraling rents of Zone II.71  A 1945 survey of 400 buildings in Zone II
found that 126 of them had been condemned, yet still housed 2,258 people
who were ‘crowded into dark, dismal, insanitary buildings’.72  By 1947, there
were 338 ‘non-native’ households, numbering perhaps over 1,000 people,
renting accommodation in Zone III.73  African tenants were turned out of
their rooms to make way for wealthier Asian tenants. They moved either to
peri-urban settlements or into vibanda or huts, numbering over one thousand
in 1945, which African landlords had constructed in their backyards.74
Lacking the resources to create sufficient housing to meet demand, colonial
officials relied instead upon regulatory cost controls to manage Dar es Salaam’s
housing crisis in the 1940s. The government passed a Rent Restriction
Ordinance in 1941 that limited rental increases to ten percent of the rent paid
on 3rd September 1939, the date of  the war’s outbreak. However, enforcement
depended on parties bringing disputes to the township rent control board.
Officials soon came to consider the rent restriction board ineffective. In the
first seven months of 1948, only one case was brought before the board
seeking rent reduction – most cases involved either landlords seeking to
dispossess tenants, or tenants complaining of illegal acts by landlords to induce
them to leave, such as removing part of a room’s thatch roofing in order to
allow rain to pour in. One African renter complained that African landlords
not only charged black-market rents, but threatened to evict anyone who
reported the illegal rents to government—in one case, some one hundred
lodgers reported illegal rents to the liwali, upon which they were evicted by
their landlords and ‘are now residing at shambas’. In the tribunal following the
1947 general strike, the District Officer reported that owners had threatened
tenants with witchcraft if  they did not pay higher rents and, through fear,
many tenants agreed.75
While few Africans took up representations to the government rent board
to gain redress, African landlord and tenant together embraced racial politics,
offering polemics against the Indian ‘invasion’ of Kariakoo. The African
independent newspaper Dunia located the forces of housing exploitation in
the transgression of  established racial boundaries. The paper’s editor, R. M.
Plantan, observed that high rents were driving Indians out of  Uhindini (literally,
‘place of Indians’) and into Uswahilini (‘place of Swahilis), depriving Africans
of their racial urban home. Pandering to the state’s own visions of racial
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order, Plantan rhetorically asked if  the government would ‘agree to the mixture
of your palm leave-roofed houses with those of Indians’, and speculated,
‘[w]ill it not be necessary to embark on a new move to the cracking creeks?
Who is to blame? Well, we must not cry against a move—we must only go on
until we reach Pugu’.76  Plantan did briefly consider African complicity in the
housing crisis:
The housing difficulties are caused through the greed of the wenyeji
(‘natives’). They turn out their fellow natives who pay Shgs 6/- p.m. for a
room in order to obtain large rents by leasing the whole house to Indians or
whites, and so it continues, until many people are homeless, and the Indians
have spread to every quarter of the native area. So let this Government
take notice and remove the whites from the houses in the native areas,
returning them to the Europeans or Indian quarters, for by living in the
native area they avoid payment of high rents and their evasion damages
the native.77
Elaborating racial invectives, however, proved more attractive to Plantan
and most of his readers than investigating the exploitation of African landlords.
While a government worker argued that wages should be raised ‘to pay house
rents as an Indian can pay in African quarters’, he emphasized that Indians
should be removed from Zone III, except those with shops, in order to free
up housing for Africans. Plantan’s solution was to re-establish urban racial
order—if the government would only remove Indians from Uswahilini, then
‘Africans themselves would be able to live in comfort in their buildings’.78  He
later declined to publish a letter critical of both African landlords and the
‘agitating African’ who sought to prevent the former from realizing his or her
investment by refusing higher rents.79  The Tanganyika African Government
Servants Association, representing the salaried group most sharply affected
by the housing crisis of the 1940s, understood the problem in wholly racial
terms. They protested that Indians were ‘overflowing into the African portion
of the town’,80  and that it ‘should consider some way of reducing and/or
expelling the number of Asians now residing and/or occupying houses in
African quarters area’.81  A Kisutu resident wondered when ‘Indians in our
town will be given the order to leave our buildings’, to which Plantan responded
by imploring his readers to buy a building plot in the area himself to prevent
further Indian expansion.82  Few residents, landlords, or officials publicly took
the cool view of Abdulwahid Sykes, who described rental increases as ‘a boon
rather than a menace to house owners irrespective of race’ because it raised
needed capital for further housing construction.83  In other words, few could
accept arguments in favour of  gentrification at face value. For many, reviving
racial zoning was a sufficient solution to a difficult economic problem.
Officials were increasingly sympathetic to popular African demands to re-
segregate Kariakoo, but remained unclear about the legality of non-native
tenancies on African property, as the question was entangled with poorly
understood commercial zoning policies. As late as 1944, the highly competent
District Commissioner Dick Bone had to ask Municipal Secretary Helps where
the ‘so-called “Trading Area”’ in Zone III was located, and what was the
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authority for restricting trade—to which the veteran Helps scribbled ‘not
sure!’ and ‘none’, respectively.84  The planning sub-committee of  Dar es Salaam’s
other local governing body, the Township Authority, recommended that trading
in Zone III be restricted to Africans only, which S. B. Malik – the board’s
president and an imposing business figure in Dar es Salaam – refused on
grounds that such segregation opposed the principles of the Mandate. In
1945, the government attempted to effect a compromise of sorts between
non-racialism and ‘native’ protection by allowing Africans to gain three-year
rights of occupancy over trading plots at a standard rent while ‘non-natives’
had to pay rent determined at auction.85
The September 1947 dockworker’s strike – caused in large part by the
housing crisis – moved officials to seek a more immediate solution.86  The
Labour Commissioner recommended mass Asian evictions from Zone III
and to appoint an African Rent Restriction baraza. In January 1948, the
government halted further leasing by natives to non-natives, as well as property
sales to non-natives, in the Kariakoo area except on extraordinary grounds.87
The District Officer wrote that the African housing problem ‘is in reality not
so much the problem of African housing as it is of Asian expansion into
African areas’, and, with considerable exaggeration, claimed that ‘[t]he lure of
high rentals paid by Asians has virtually meant that 90 percent of Kariakoo,
once a purely African area, is now either owned or leased by Asians’ – his
successor reduced the figure to 60 percent.88  Even officials who viewed the
housing crisis in primarily economic terms understood that popular racial
understandings made it an immediate question of  political stability. The arrival
of building materials in the early 1950s finally eased the housing crisis
somewhat, and the subsequent increased enforcement of building codes led
to the more efficient removal of African squatters. In the words of an
anonymous intelligence officer, this ‘combined to create a general impression
amongst African residents that there is a drive to oust them from the
Municipality in favour of Asians and Europeans . . . [t]his feeling is at the
moment widespread, and the cause of considerable discontent’.89  The town’s
District Officer also noted that rumors were circulating among Africans that
the purpose of new town planning proposals was to demolish African houses
overnight to give the plots to Indians.90  Reflected in both the rumours of  the
street as well as in the articulated policies of African bureaucrats, reversing
this pattern of Indian-led gentrification had become a central goal of incipient
African racial populism in Dar es Salaam on the eve of nationalist politics.
Conclusion
The British colonial state devised a rather modest and ineffective tool kit for
guiding urban development in Dar es Salaam. Spatial urban policies that sought
to segregate Dar es Salaam between ‘native’ Africans and ‘non-native’
immigrants through building codes and land tenure proved sufficient to
facilitate the removal of inconveniently-located Africans living in Zones I and
II, or what were firmly to become the European and Indian neighbourhoods
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of the town during the colonial period. But colonial urban growth also relied
heavily upon the investment of private capital, the lion’s share of which lay in
the hands of Indians living in a small and tightly circumscribed location. The
urban policy of gentrification provoked political resistance when it aided and
legitimated the expansion of Indian households into majority African
neighbourhoods. Although few in government were committed to urban
segregation as a policy of positive protection for Africans from being priced
out of their ‘zone’, embittered African tenants embraced this implied promise
by demanding that government support the racial integrity of neighbourhoods
such as Kariakoo and Ilala. The state’s abandonment of spatial segregation in
favour of an urban policy centred on managing urban living costs through
rationing and rent controls in the 1940s only strengthened the resentment
held by emerging African politicians in Dar es Salaam towards Indian
interlopers, although many African landlords quietly benefited from these
developments. The colonial government had entangled itself by its
simultaneous reliance upon Indian commercial wealth and African political
consent, and proved increasingly powerless to mediate the growing conflict
between the two during the 1940s and 1950s.
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